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Social Security—the nation’s largest tax-and-transfer program—faces an
u n c e rtain future as the baby boom generation approaches re t i re m e n t .
Funding a large generation’s pensions out of a small generation’s taxes
poses a formidable challenge. The system is now building re s e rv e s —
which are automatically invested in special-issue Treasury securities and
thus finance much of the rest of government—but these reserves will not
be sufficient to finance future promised benefits. Taxes will have to be
raised, benefits trimmed, or reserves invested in assets that render higher
returns than those expected from Treasury issues.
In this brief Senior Fellow Walter M. Cadette compares two opposing
visions for Social Security’s future. One would keep the system much as it
is today: a defined-benefits plan providing a base level of support to all in
re t i rement. The other would “privatize” it, grafting onto it a defined-
contribution plan much like a 401(k) and shrinking its public benefits.
These are basically the two approaches sketched in the re p o rt of the
1994–1996 Advisory Council on Social Security released earlier this year. 
Cadette concludes that, on balance, the nation would be better off
keeping Social Security much as it is today; despite troublesome demo-
graphics, the system can be put on sound financial footing for decades
to come with relatively minor changes in tax rates and benefits form u -
las. Such changes would yield enough additional re s e rves to tide the
system over what otherwise would be large shortfalls in income after
2030. Although he does not necessarily endorse the specific measure s
advanced by those on the advisory council who would keep Social
Security much as it is tod a y, Cadette feels that the group is right in
s t ressing that radical revamping is not needed to remedy the system’s
l o n g - t e rm financial problems. Whatever privatization’s advantages may
be, they are a poor substitute for the benefit Social Security has off e re d
the nation since the 1930s: a guaranteed base level of income support
for virtually all retiring workers. Privatization would involve risk for the
vast number of people who have no “private” pension and, by tying
re t i rement benefits to each worker’s own investments, would circ u m-
scribe the capacity of the system to subsidize benefits to low-income
re t i re e s — i ro n i c a l l y, at the very time net benefits must become more
p ro g ressive than they were in the past.
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to the returns Social Security contributions can provide to beneficiaries
at large, government has any interest in seeing to it that Social Security
beneficiaries receive more than a socially acceptable base level of
s u p p o rt in re t i rement. Privatization implies that it does and would
require that government collect what would still have to be labeled taxes
to ensure that the interest is met. The higher re t u rns on “privatized”
Social Security taxes, moreover, would be at the expense of lower returns
received by other claimants on the income financial capital can provide.
Privatization, it is true, would raise national saving, but that is only
because it would raise taxes to make good on the existing commitments
of the system—a necessity given the dedication of much of future Social
Security revenue to individually owned and managed accounts.
If the choice is made to keep Social Security much as it is, Cadette
recommends additional income tax incentives to promote saving on the
grounds that they would make for faster growth of the capital stock and
productivity and thus ease the transfer of income from a relatively small
to a relatively large generation. Saving incentives would also help soften
the unpopular measures that will be needed to right the system’s long-
term financial imbalance (currently estimated at 2.2 percent of taxable
p a y roll). Any reduction in benefits or increase in taxes to remedy the
imbalance will require difficult and explicit trade-offs. Serious national
dialogue about those trade-offs should have begun long ago. The demo-
graphics, after all, are hardly news. If tod a y ’s remedy is just over 2
p e rcent of taxable payroll, tomorro w ’s perf o rce will be higher, and the
trade-offs will be all the more painful to make. Hard decisions will also
have to be made if policymakers strive to improve the equity and effi-
ciency of the system, which also are in need of repair.
The challenge to Social Security is twofold: to bring the system into
l o n g - run financial balance while pre s e rving its popularity and to set a
course for the system that is in balance with all the other obligations of
g o v e rnment. Support of the elderly and the near-elderly under Social
Security and publicly financed health care programs already requires an
overall tax rate approaching 10 percent of GDP; government’s ability to
meet all its obligations will be even more in question over the next
decades than it is now. 
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Social Security system. Baby boomers on the verge of re t i rement and
younger workers thinking about their future are questioning the ability
of the system to provide them with the same level of benefits their
parents enjoyed. 
Thus far, the system has been able to maintain itself and has even built
up sizable re s e rves, mainly because of the increasing income and
p roductivity of each succeeding generation in a growing economy.
Although commonly thought of by the American public as a system in
which retiring workers receive as benefits the money they paid  into it,
in truth Social Security has always been pay-as-you-go. The payro l l
taxes levied on the workers of today are not “saved” for those workers’
re t i rement, but are paid out as benefits to the current re t i rees. But the
s y s t e m ’s financial security will soon face a demographic challenge
b rought about by increased longevity, lower birthrates, and the popula-
tion bulge of the baby boom. Thirty years ago the ratio of workers to
re t i rees was 4 to 1, today it is 3 to 1, and by 2030 it is expected to be 2
to 1. It is possible that tomorro w ’s workers will not be able to support
t o m o rro w ’s re t i re e s .
Concern about safeguarding Social Security’s future has led policymakers
and the public to consider alternative plans for keeping funding and
benefits in balance. One option is to make relatively minor changes in
funding methods and benefits while maintaining the system much as it
is. The other option is to privatize the system, thus radically changing it.
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The gap between rich and poor in the United States has grown. And, as
Senior Fellow Walter M. Cadette points out in this Public Policy Brief,
even though Social Security has through the years fulfilled its funda-
mental purpose of assuring a base level of support for all retired workers,
some of its provisions have contributed to an inequitable distribution of
wealth by transferring wealth from low-wage workers to wealthy retirees.
In addressing the issue of Social Security’s future, policymakers cannot
i g n o re the broader issues of income inequality in the nation and the
equity of the Social Security system.
In this brief Cadette describes the current system, discusses positive and
negatives aspects of both options for changing it, and offers some of his
own suggestions for putting Social Security on sound financial footing.
His goal is to provide readers with the information they will need to
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The post–World War II baby boom has left its mark on the American
economy in many ways. Nurseries and schools bulged beyond capacity.
The labor market could not absorb new entrants without also giving rise
to disappointing productivity growth. The relative price of housing
s o a red. And, now, yet another challenge looms: this time for Social
S e c u r i t y, as the leading edge of the baby boom approaches re t i re m e n t .
Longevity adds to the problem created by a large generation. Thanks to
m od e rn medicine, more people live to re t i rement age, and they live
longer as retirees. As the product of these forces and of the drop in the
nation’s birthrate after the mid 1960s, an unprecedentedly low ratio of
workers to Social Security beneficiaries lies ahead. The ratio fell from as
high as 4 to 1 thirty years ago to about 3 to 1 today and is projected to
drop to 2 to 1 thirty years from now. 
How the demographic challenge is met will profoundly affect not only
the Social Security system but the broader budget outcome and the
economy at large. Already, Social Security—understood here to encom-
pass the Old-Age (OA), Survivors (S), and Disability (D), but not the
Health (H) Insurance (I) parts of OASDHI—accounts for 22 percent of
federal spending and 5 percent of gross domestic product (GDP). Within
the next several decades the percentages could easily rise by a third and
perhaps as much as half. 
Although projections that far into the future may fall wide of the mark,
even now two things are clear. First, tabloidesque characterizations of
Social Security’s “going broke” are out of place. The system can maintain
benefits for more than 30 years at current tax rates, to judge by the base-case
assumptions in the last annual re p o rt of its trustees (Social Security
The Challenge of Financing 
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fits for several decades, it cannot make good on all of its benefits promises in
the longer run without significantly higher payroll taxes (Steuerle and
Bakija 1994). After 2030, the trustees project, only thre e - q u a rters of benefits
can be maintained at current tax rates. And, as early as 2010 benefits will
exceed taxes. For a time thereafter re s e rves (which are held in the form of
special-issue Tre a s u ry securities) will remain on the rise as interest on them
continues to accrue. But re s e rves will grow less rapidly and will then start to
decline as benefits continue to exceed taxes (see Figures 1 and 2).
D i ffering Models for the Future 
One of two visions of Social Security’s future would keep the system
much as it is today, but tailor benefits formulas and taxation to the new
demographic exigencies. The other would “privatize” it, grafting onto
the system a defined-contribution plan much like a 401(k) and shrinking
its public benefits. These are the main lines of the two competing
a p p roaches sketched in the re p o rt of the Advisory Council on Social
Security (1997) released earlier this year.1
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Figure 1 Estimated Income and Outgo, Based on Intermediate Assumptions,
of the Combined OASI and DI Trust Funds in Constant 1997 Dollars
N o t e : Estimates for later years are not shown because the combined trust funds are esti-
mated to become exhausted in 2029 under the intermediate assumptions.
Source: Social Security Administration, The 1997 Annual Report of the Board of Trustees of
the Federal Old-Age and Survivors Insurance and Disability Insurance Trust Funds
(Washington, D.C.: 1997), Table III.B2.
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and increases in taxes on benefits to eliminate about two-thirds of the
long-run actuarial imbalance, which today is estimated at 2.2 percent of
taxable payroll (Social Security Administration 1997).2 They also
propose that policymakers consider investing up to 40 percent of system
reserves in equities to correct the remaining one-third of the imbalance.
Investment in the stock market (on the premise that its relatively high
returns will carry over into the future) would limit the program changes
that otherwise would be needed. 
Investing reserves in the stock market instead of in Treasuries would be a
major change in federal finance as a whole, as it would force the Treasury
to find private outlets for any federal debt the Social Security trust funds
would not purchase.3 But it would not be a departure for Social Security
itself. The risk involved in the system’s new investment strategy would
be borne publicly and the defined-benefits character of the pro g r a m
would be maintained (hence the label “maintenance of benefits” for this
plan). From the perspective of the pensioner and the taxpayer, nothing
would have changed. 
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F i g u re 2 Estimated Assets, Based on Intermediate Assumptions, of the
Combined OASI and DI Trust Funds in Constant 1997 Dollars
N o t e : Estimates for later years are not shown because the combined trust funds are esti-
mated to become exhausted in 2029 under the intermediate assumptions.
Source: Social Security Administration, The 1997 Annual Report of the Board of Trustees of
the Federal Old-Age and Survivors Insurance and Disability Insurance Trust Funds
(Washington, D.C.: 1997), Table III.B2.
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members, would dedicate 5 percentage points of the current 12.4 percent
OASDI tax rate on covered earnings (this year, a maximum of $65,400)
to individually managed personal security accounts. Although such
investment would operate under government strictures (regulating, for
example, withdrawal of funds before re t i rement age), the privatized
assets would be owned by the individual and could therefore be passed
on to heirs. 
Another two council members, among them Chairman Edward M.
Gramlich, advocated a smaller, but conceptually similar, privatization
plan, to be funded by a tax of 1.6 percentage points on top of the 12.4
p e rcent. The Gramlich plan would limit asset choice to a handful of
government-approved mutual funds and any privatized assets would have
to be annuitized, as Social Security is today. But, like the more ambitious
personal security accounts privatization plan, the Gramlich variant
moves Social Security away from a defined-benefits plan and in the
direction of a defined-contribution plan. 
N a t u re of the Choice 
This brief compares the two visions of Social Security’s future. (It does
not consider in any detail the Gramlich plan, as it is an amalgam of
the two.) Its object is to give readers the background they need to
understand the arguments made by both sides and thus to follow the
debate on privatization that promises to unfold at the national level 
in the next few years—first, perhaps, in the confines of a pre s i d e n t i a l
commission and later in Congress and the political arena at larg e .
T h e re is no mistaking what is at stake. It ultimately is a choice be-
tween a communitarian and an individualistic approach to the eco-
nomic security of the elderly. 
On balance, the nation would be better off keeping Social Security
much as it is today. Despite troublesome demographics, the system can
be put on sound financial footing for decades to come with re l a t i v e l y
minor changes in tax rates or benefits formulas, as indicated by today’s
relatively small imbalance of 2.2 percent. Such changes would yield
enough additional reserves to tide the system over what otherwise would
Safeguarding Social Security
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advanced by the maintenance of benefits group are the “right” ones is
another issue. But, clearly, the group is right in stressing that radical
revamping of Social Security is not needed to remedy the system’s long-
term financial problems. 
Privatization is a poor substitute for the benefit Social Security has
o ff e red the nation since the 1930s: a guaranteed base level of income
support for virtually all retiring workers, half of whom have no “private”
pension. It would create risks that many—because of low income—
should not run. Moreover, by tying retirement benefits to each worker’s
own investments, privatization would circumscribe the capacity of the
system to subsidize benefits to low-income re t i re e s — i ro n i c a l l y, at the
v e ry time net benefits (that is, the annuity value of benefits over the
annuity value of taxes paid in) must become more progressive than they
were in the past. 
Privatization would add to the returns Social Security contributions can
p rovide to beneficiaries at large, but it is questionable whether that
should concern government. Why would government compel people to
save as individuals? Does government have any interest in seeing to it
that Social Security beneficiaries receive more than a socially acceptable
base level of support in retirement? Privatization implies that it does and
would have government collect what would still have to be labeled taxes
to ensure that the interest is met. The higher re t u rns on “privatized”
Social Security taxes, moreover, would be at the expense of lower returns
received by other claimants on the income financial capital can provide. 
Privatization, it is true, would raise national saving. But that is only
because it would raise taxes to make good on the existing commitments
of the system—a necessity given the dedication of much of future Social
Security revenue to individually owned and managed accounts. Nothing
else can be claimed for it. 
If, at the end of the day, the choice is to keep Social Security much as it
is, additional income tax incentives to promote saving are in order. They
would make for faster growth of the capital stock and productivity and
thus ease the transfer of income from a relatively small to a re l a t i v e l y
large generation. There are, after all, ways to raise national saving other
The Challenge of Financing the Baby Boom’s Retire m e n t
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viable. Saving incentives are also in order from the narrow perspective of
Social Security itself. They would help to soften the unpopular measures
that will be needed to right the system’s long-term financial imbalance. 
Unpopular those measures are sure to be. A reduction in benefits or
increase in payroll taxes, even if just over 2 percent of taxable payroll,
will require difficult and explicit trade-offs. Hard decisions will also have
to be made if, while policymakers are at it, they strive to improve the
equity and efficiency of the system, which also are in need of repair. 
Serious national dialogue about those trade-offs should have begun long
ago. The demographics, after all, are hardly news. That dialogue has
been tabled time and again—the last time during the 1996 presidential
campaign—in deference to Social Security’s status as an untouchable, if
not a “third rail,” program. The political establishment’s reluctance to
confront known problems before they become “crises” is apparently alive
and well. If tod a y ’s remedy is just over 2 percent of taxable payro l l ,
tomorrow’s perforce will be higher, and the trade-offs will be all the more
painful to make. 
The challenge to Social Security is twofold. First is the almost Catch-22
p roblem of bringing the system into long-run financial balance while
preserving its popularity and second is the task of setting a course for the
system that is in balance with all the other obligations of government.
S u p p o rt of the elderly and the near-elderly under Social Security and
publicly financed health care programs already re q u i res an overall tax
rate approaching 10 percent of GDP; it can go only up from there, quite
possibly doubling within the next few decades. Government’s ability to
meet its other obligations will be in question even more than it is now. 
The problem of financing Medicare and other government health care
programs for the elderly is outside the scope of this paper. Policy deci-
sions with respect to OASDI can be made on their own merits, as can
those in the area of health care. Indeed, that is implicit in the separate
trust funds established for Old-Age and Survivors Insurance, Disability
Insurance, and Health Insurance and in the different payroll taxes that
finance OASDI and HI. It must be kept in mind, however, that the
demographic forces at work in Social Security re t i rement also aff e c t
Safeguarding Social Security
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least, the programs draw resources from a common pool. 
Social Security: Stru c t u re and Function 
In order to evaluate the alternative approaches, it is important to under-
stand how benefits are stru c t u red, how Social Security affects the
b roader budget outcome, and how the system transfers income within
and across generations. 
Benefits are set by a worker’s lifetime earnings, adjusted to reflect earn-
ings prevailing in the economy at large about the time of the worker’s
retirement; they are not set, as the common misconception would have
it, by taxes paid. This “bank account” model was fostered by “I paid into
it” thinking, a seemingly logical outcome of payroll tax financing. It 
was also fostered by the political establishment, which did not want the
cost of any largesse on the benefits side to be apparent to taxpayers.
Taxpayers were encouraged to view their payroll taxes as saving for their
own retirement. 
Although the system is now building re s e rves, it is still largely pay-as-
you-go. And it was entirely pay-as-you-go through the late 1980s. Each
generation, in effect, pays for the retirement of its parents and, in turn, is
supported by its children—the essence of a tax-and-transfer system oper-
ating across generations. The retiring (older) and working (younger)
generations are parents and children writ large in the underlying model
of the family (Mehrling 1996). In the traditional family parents’ own
c h i l d ren assumed the provider role—sometimes successfully and some-
times not. Now, instead, the income of the older generation as a whole
depends on the income and productivity of the younger generation,
whose success as provider is guaranteed in a growing economy. 
F rom the point of view of the family model, tod a y ’s emphasis on
“ m o n e y ’s worth” calculations—in the advisory council’s re p o rt and in
other forums for debating Social Security’s future—is overdone. Money’s
w o rth is surely a valid consideration, but Social Security is not, and
never was, a saving and investment plan; rather, it is, and always was, a
way for children to support elderly parents (here writ small) with income
The Challenge of Financing the Baby Boom’s Retire m e n t
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all, cases. It is as hard to make reliable money’s worth calculations for
Social Security as it is to estimate the returns to be derived from paying
an aged parent’s rent bill. 
Calculating Benefits 
Benefits are pro g ressive, that is, they are high relative to the lifetime
e a rnings of low-income workers and low relative to the earnings of high-
income workers, thus countering the re g ressivity of a flat payroll tax rate
on earnings up to a ceiling. The object is to provide a base level of
s u p p o rt in re t i rement, linked to the living standard most workers (that is,
all but those with top earnings) attained during their working life. The
object is not to maintain the income of high-income workers, who ord i-
narily have ample personal and employment-linked re t i rement re s o u rc e s .
Whether those re s o u rces are, in fact, ample cannot be a matter of public
policy concern. 
Benefits are keyed to each worker’s average lifetime earnings, adjusted to
reflect the economywide wage level just before the worker’s retirement.
This allows retirees, at least initially, to capture the growth in produc-
tivity and thus in real earnings that came about during their working
life. Only initial benefits are linked to prevailing wages, however. After
retirement, benefits are escalated by inflation, measured by the previous
year’s rise in the consumer price index (CPI), but they do not increase
with real earnings. In short, they keep up with inflation, but not with
general living standards. 
The calculations for a new re t i ree start with the history of his or her
earnings at age 60. The earnings for each year, up to the taxable wage
base for that year, are multiplied by an index factor that reflects the
subsequent growth in economywide wages. The resulting series (with
earnings after age 60 indexed at a value of one) thus captures what the
worker would have earned each year had he or she been working in
t od a y ’s environment of relatively high productivity rather than in the
past (see Table 1). From the time series of indexed earnings, the highest
35 years are averaged and then divided by 12 to compute the average
indexed monthly earnings (AIME). 
Safeguarding Social Security
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is what the worker will receive each month at re t i rement if he or she
re t i res at the normal re t i rement age of 65. The PIA is calculated by
dividing the AIME into three parts, multiplying each part by succes-
sively lower percentages, and summing the resulting dollar amounts. The
t h ree amounts to be summed are 90 percent of $422, the first AIME
“bend point” for 1994 (which is when someone now age 65 turned 62);
32 percent of the next $2,123; and 15 percent of the amount in excess of
$2,545. The PIA is then adjusted for retirement age within the range of
–20 percent (for those retiring as early as age 62) to +25 percent (for
those willing to wait until age 70). These percentages are slated to
change slightly in the future to provide a premium of 8 percent per year
for postponing retirement—the object being to structure an age-neutral
annuity for those retiring at 62, at 70, or at any age in between. The
actuarially fair value of lifetime benefits will be the same for all, theoreti-
cally rendering the normal re t i rement age of 65 (or 67 as current law
would have it rise to over time) almost meaningless. 
A “spousal benefit,” equal to 50 percent of the retiring worker’s PIA, is
also factored in, even if the spouse never worked. Both members of a
two-wage couple receive benefits in their own right, but, at a minimum,
the lower earner of the two is entitled to the spousal benefit attaching to
the higher earn e r’s pension. Benefits formulas thus favor couples with
widely disparate earnings—at the extreme, one-wage couples—which is
The Challenge of Financing the Baby Boom’s Retire m e n t
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Table 1  Calculating the Pension of an Average Wage Earner Retiring at
Age 65 in 1997
5-Year  Average Annual Average Index Average Indexed
Period Ending Earnings (dollars) Factor Earnings (dollars)
1996 26,500 1.00 26,500
1991 21,800 1.14 24,855
1986 17,300 1.43 24,739
1981 13,800 1.97 27,186
1976 9,200 2.82 25.944
1971 6,500 3.91 25,415
1966 5,000 5.02 25,100
Note: The highest 35 years of indexed earnings average $25,677, which divided by 12 gives
an average indexed monthly earnings (AIME) of $2,140. The calculations are done in the
table as five-year averages to simplify and shorten the table. The actual calculations are
done for each year. The premise is that none of the highest 35 years of earnings came
before 1962.
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force participation rate of women was far below today’s and joblessness
abounded. 
The bend points, like the AIME, are indexed to prevailing wages. The
f o rmulas thus are designed to increase average real benefits for successive
c o h o rts of new re t i rees at roughly the same rate as economywide wages. The
object is to keep replacement rates (the percentage of earnings just before
re t i rement that Social Security replaces) constant over time. The object also
is to keep replacement rates constant between one income group and
another in every retiring cohort (this comes about because the perc e n t a g e s
applying to the AIME amounts below each bend point are fixed).
Successively lower percentages at each bend point provide the pro g re s s i v i t y. 
P a t t e rn of Replacement Rates 
Replacement rates are higher today than the historical norm for the
majority of retirees (Steuerle and Bakija 1994), but they are in line with
outcomes under benefits formulas set out as early as 1939 (Myers 1993).
For single workers at age 65, for example, Social Security replaces about
53 percent of earnings just before re t i rement for those at low wages,
about 40 percent for those at average wages. In contrast, today’s replace-
ment rates are below the historical norm for high-wage workers. They
are in the neighborhood of 26 percent of preretirement earnings close to
the maximum wage base (replacement rates decline beyond that base,
since only earnings below the base are included in calculating benefits).4
Replacement rates today cluster in the range of 10 to 30 perc e n t a g e
points higher than in the early 1950s. At that time, in the absence of
adjustment mechanisms that would have seemed unnecessary in the
d e f l a t i o n a ry 1930s, Social Security had failed to keep up with the rise in
the price level during and just after World War II. Legislation enacted in
1950 was designed to correct that oversight. But ad hoc changes made in
ensuing years, combined with the 1950 measure, had the net effect of
lifting real benefits not only for new re t i rees but for beneficiaries at
l a rge—including the nonelderly disabled, who became eligible for bene-
fits for the first time in 1956. A virtual bidding war to raise re t i re m e n t
and other benefits (which at the time were not indexed to inflation but
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late 1960s and early 1970s. Benefits rose an extraord i n a ry 72 percent in
the five-year period ending in 1972; real benefits rose by nearly half (the
CPI in the five-year period increased 28 percent). All the while, the ratio
of workers to re t i rees, even if high by tod a y ’s standards, was on the decline.
Replacement rates came down from the peaks they reached in the mid-
1970s when a flaw introduced into the calculation of benefits in 1972
was corrected. The bidding war came to an end at the same time with
the adoption of automatic escalation of benefits keyed to the CPI. Even
so, Social Security outlays had risen roughly 10 times as rapidly as
nominal GDP between the early 1950s and the early 1980s. Tax rates
had more than tripled, applied against a wage base that relative to
prevailing wages had also more than tripled.
Watershed 1983 
Payroll taxes took another jump in the 1980s when increases in tax rates
legislated in the 1970s were moved forw a rd in order to deal with a
looming liquidity problem. OASDI taxes rose in a series of steps fro m
10.8 percent of covered payroll (employer and employee combined) in
1983 to the current rate of 12.4 percent by 1990. Benefits were reduced
at the same time, principally by raising the normal retirement age and by
making some benefits taxable (in effect, reducing them). The norm a l
retirement age was slated to rise gradually, beginning in 2003, to age 67
by 2027. Currently, benefits become subject to tax when income exceeds
$32,000 on a joint return ($25,000 on a single return). At those levels
50 percent of the benefits get taxed, but the percentage quickly rises 
to 85 percent as other income rises. The exemption amounts are not
inflation-indexed and thus decline in real terms over time. 
The effect of the changes, even if not the intention, was to build re s e rv e s
in a period of demographic calm that can be drawn down later when the
baby boom generation actually re t i res. In a pay-as-you-go system, re s e rv e s
other than for liquidity purposes have no place, but they can play a useful
role by smoothing the pattern of taxes over time. In effect, the baby boom
generation was to finance not just the re t i rement of their parents but,
t h rough the accumulation of re s e rves, part of their own as well. 
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a re projected to grow to $1.5 trillion in constant 1997 dollars by the
peak year 2015 (Social Security Administration 1997). Automatically
invested in Treasury issues, Social Security’s surplus financed almost 40
percent of the deficit of $173 billion in the rest of the budget in fiscal
year 1996; the OASDI trust funds hold just over 10 percent of gro s s
federal debt.5
Critics of these arrangements view the trust funds (and there f o re the
re s e rves held in the form of Tre a s u ry securities) as a fiction. They view
the funds as holding not real securities but merely IOUs of the
Tre a s u ry generated by deficit financing itself. To make good on those
IOUs, the concern is, Washington must raise taxes, cut spending, or
float more debt in private markets. Those IOUs, however, are not
essentially diff e rent from the Treasuries held by private pension funds
or individual investors for their own account—not marketable per-
haps, but just as “full faith and credit.” They have solid backing in 
the form of the nation’s political will to support the elderly, whether
by payroll taxes or other means, and the economic ability to do so
(Eisner 1996). 
However wide apart in perspective, the two views of the trust funds are
similar in implication. Not all that far ahead, Social Security not only
will be unable to finance a large part of the rest of the budget, it also will
have to lay claim to non–Social Security tax sources. As noted, benefits
are projected to exceed payroll taxes by 2010; other revenue will have to
supplement payroll taxes in order for the system to pay full benefits for
the subsequent 20 years—a time when it will have to, first, draw on the
interest on the Treasuries now accumulating in the trust funds and, later,
consume the principal as well. 
The critical date for Social Security, narrowly considered, is as far off as
2030, but, for the budget at large, it looms as early as 2010. Thereafter,
Social Security benefits can be maintained at current tax rates, but only
if, in some combination, federal borrowing from the public rises,
spending for other federal activities is cut, and taxes are raised. The chal-
lenge the nation faces is not only to correct Social Security’s long-ru n
financial imbalance, but also to find the revenue to repay the system for
the large net lending it will have done for several decades. 
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Social Security’s appeal over the years has been grounded in the fact 
that almost all of its beneficiaries have been “winners.” Almost all 
have secured a retirement annuity significantly greater in present value
than the value of the payroll taxes they and their employers jointly
“contributed” during their working life, and they have had the assurance
that their families would be protected financially in the event of their
death or disability before retirement age. Setting benefits on the basis of
prevailing wages rather than on the basis of taxes paid, in combination
with secular growth in the economy and favorable demographics, almost
guaranteed that outcome. 
With the sharp rise in Social Security taxes in the 1980s, on top of a
similarly sharp rise in the 1970s, all participants are no longer winners.
Steuerle and Bakija (1994) have calculated the present or annuity value,
in constant dollars, of OASI net income transfers for 23 age cohorts, by
family type (e.g., married, one-earner) and by lifetime income level,
retiring at five-year intervals between 1940 and 2050.6 Such a measure
c a p t u res the redistributive character of the system across and within
generations. The findings go a long way to explain why Social Security
has been immensely popular over the years but why skepticism, if not
cynicism, is growing among young workers. The key findings are: 
1.  Most retirees thus far have secured positive net income transfers, that
is, amounts in excess of the payroll taxes they and their employers
paid in, plus a reasonable rate of return. The dollar amounts of the
transfers have been the highest to high earners, as the amounts have
been figured on a high base. Thanks to progressive benefits formulas,
low earners have received the largest percentage return, but this has
been on a relatively small base. 
2. The largest net transfers went to re t i rees of the early 1980s. High-
income, one-earner families that drew a pension beginning in 1980,
for example, received a net subsidy whose annuity value in tod a y ’s
p u rchasing power was close to $200,000. These families benefited
from the bidding war of the late 1960s and early 1970s, they had paid
pre–bidding war taxes for most of their working life, and they did not
get hit by the tax hikes of the 1980s. 
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continue to provide net transfers for many beneficiaries (even if signif-
icantly less than for their parents and grandparents)—in part i c u l a r,
o n e - e a rner couples, because of spousal benefits, and two-earn e r
couples at low-income levels, because of the pro g ressivity built into
benefit formulas. 
4. Net subsidies will continue to decline in the future. They have already
turned negative for high-income, single people (the major exception
to the winner rule thus far), and they will become negative for high-
income, two-earner couples around the year 2000. 
In all, pro g ressivity will be greatly more important in shaping benefits 
as the baby boom generation re t i res. Without another jump in pay-
roll taxes, net subsidies cannot be extended to the vast majority of bene-
ficiaries. Social Security simply cannot serve the interests of young
workers—if those interests are measured by money’s wort h — a n y t h i n g
like the way it has served the interests of their parents and, even more,
their grandparents. This is not a fault of the system; it is the inevitable
result of the shift from favorable to unfavorable demographics. 
Option 1: Working within the Current Framework 
Those who view Social Security as needing midcourse corrections rather
than conceptual change would apply traditional remedies (defined
broadly to include equity investment as long as the risks are public and
the assets are managed by the government itself). These corre c t i o n s ,
they point up, can be much smaller than in other industrial countries,
which face even more problematic demographics. Compared with most
other developed countries, the United States has less imbalance in its
age structure, and its payroll taxes start at much lower levels. 
All the same, trade-offs cannot be avoided. And, even if there were
a l ready a program in place to remedy the actuarial imbalance of 2.2
percent of taxable payroll, the system would not remain in balance with
the passage of time as surplus years get replaced by deficit years and as
longevity continues to rise. As an average for the next 75 years, the 2.2
percent figure reflects near balance in the next 25 years, but deficits are
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almost 5.5 percent in the subsequent 25 years. 
As with any long-term estimate, the 2.2 percent figure will have to be
revised as time passes.7 It nevertheless serves as a useful standard against
which specific proposals can be compared. Measures that would not cut
far into the 2.2 percent and that are also apt to be highly objectionable
to the public are easy to rule out. Measures that would either offer larg e
savings or that promise relatively little outcry are similarly easy to keep
in the running. 
Advisory council members who would keep Social Security much as it is
t oday and those who would privatize it, however much they differ in
their basic approach, are in accord in counseling against relying on
i n c reases in payroll taxes to close the 2.2 percent gap. With money’s
w o rth calculations for young workers turning unfavorable, the council
was united in the concern that raising payroll taxes further would
c o m p romise the individual equity principle that was part of the basic
idea from the start. 
Cuts in benefits that affect retirees and workers alike (and workers well
up in years as well as the young) thus dominate in the proposals of the
maintenance of benefits gro u p .8 The proposals, which are summarized
b e l o w, would reduce the long-term deficit by 1.4 percentage points—
leaving 0.8 percentage points to be eliminated by other, as yet unspeci-
fied, benefits or tax measures or by investment of reserves in the stock
market, if that makes sense on further inspection. 
1. Cover all state and local government employees (the revenue from the 
additional payroll taxes net of benefits would reduce the long-term deficit an
estimated 0.22 percentage point). Almost 4 million state and local
government employees (about 25 percent) are not now covered (most
at the option of their employing governments). There is no justifica-
tion for not making the system truly universal. 
2. Tax benefits in excess of the payroll taxes re t i rees paid during their working
lives (0.31 percentage point). Taxing only the employer contribution and
the imputed re t u rns from both employer and employee contributions
would be in keeping with horizontal tax equity, treating equally the
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beneficiaries would be protected by the standard deduction and other
defenses in the code for low-income taxpayers. Either in part (as now)
or broadly (as proposed), taxation of benefits is an indirect form of
means-testing—without, however, the disincentive to save inherent in
d i rect means-testing. 
3. Redirect the income taxes on Social Security benefits from the health insur -
ance trust fund to the OASDI trust funds (0.31 percentage point).9 There
is no logic for attributing much of the revenue from taxes on benefits
to HI. However technical, the issue of where to lodge this re v e n u e
points up the nexus between Medicare’s and Social Security’s financial
problems.10
4. Reflect changes incorporated in the CPI in 1996 by the Bureau of Labor
Statistics (0.31 percentage point). Out of concern for the integrity of the
computations, all council members opposed making any legislative
change in cost-of-living adjustments. 
5. Compute the AIME using 38 years, instead of 35 (0.28 perc e n t a g e
p o i n t s ) .1 1 A change of this nature would reduce benefits for future
beneficiaries by about 3 percent. One member of the group opposed it
as unfair to women, who typically spend several years out of the work
force bringing up their children. 
Closing the Gap on the Benefits Side 
The maintenance of benefits group selected proposals from an array of
possible actions, all of which carry pluses and minuses, both substantive
and political. The broad public policy issue is which of Social Security’s
potentially conflicting goals—individual equity (which is reflected in
the use of lifetime earnings to set benefits) and social adequacy (which is
reflected in progressive benefits)—should get more emphasis in a setting
of greater potential clash between the two than ever before. 
T h ree changes in particular have merit: raising the re t i rement age,
reducing benefits to high-income retirees (directly as well as indirectly
through the taxation of benefits), and raising survivor benefits. None of
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resolve the potential clash in the direction of social adequacy. 
The re t i rement age has to be reexamined against a background of
increasing longevity. In 1940 average life expectancy at age 20 was 67 for
men and 70 for women. Today it is 74 for men and 80 for women, and it
is projected to rise another two years by 2020. Today a man who reaches
age 65 can expect to celebrate his 80th birthday and a woman will see
her 84th birthday—three and five years longer, respectively, than when
Social Security was first established with a normal retirement age of 65. 
One proposal, advocated by many students of Social Security, would be
to lift the normal retirement age to 68 (once it hits the already sched-
uled rise to 67) and then index it to life expectancy. Indexing would
maintain the relationship between working and re t i rement years—and
thereby add a stability feature to the system it now lacks. 
Tod a y, retiring in the early 60s, or even at age 65, means spending
almost a third of one’s adult life as a retiree. Is that the product of insti-
tutional arrangements, like Social Security, that date from the 1930s and
that are distinctly less relevant now? And do these arrangements make
even less sense because the ratio of workers to re t i rees is to fall to
unprecedentedly low levels?  
The ramifications of leaving the re t i rement age untouched as life expectancy
i n c reases are far- reaching. Making a living that has to be stretched over ever
longer re t i rement means longer work weeks, less vacation, and more stre s s —
indeed, a concentration of work eff o rt that can take an unhealthy toll on
individuals and on society at large (Steuerle, personal communication 1997).
Workers are not willing to accept a lowering of compensation as their
p roductivity declines with age, and employers are reluctant to lower compen-
sation when productivity declines, partly because they fear an accusation of
ageism in a society that is increasingly litigious over group rights (Thompson,
personal communication 1997); employers opt instead to force re t i re m e n t ,
even if they have to sweeten it with “packages.”1 2
The point is often made that raising the re t i rement age hurts manual
workers and others, like firefighters, with physically demanding jobs. It
would be imprudent, however, to stru c t u re rules for a universal system
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of Social Security, not the re t i rement part, to support the incomes of
people unable to work. 
One danger (which the 1983 legislation succumbed to) is to increase the
normal retirement age (from 65) without increasing the early retirement
age (from 62). Even with an annuity stru c t u red to be neutral with
respect to age of re t i rement, many will opt for early re t i rement, espe-
cially with employers shedding workers in their late 50s and early 60s.
As the normal retirement age rises to 67 in coming years, early retirees
will pay even higher penalties in the form of reduced pensions, which
years later will yield an even higher poverty rate among the so-called
old-old (those 85 and over). 
Significant economies could accrue from relatively small changes in
benefits formulas that affect high-income workers, for example, lowering
the 15 percent factor used to compute the PIA or adding a fourt h
percentage factor (of, say, 10 percent) at top AIME levels. 
Lowering the top end of benefits (along with added income taxation of
benefits) would reduce the redistribution of income from many poor
workers to many well-heeled retirees—a feature of the system that has
been widely criticized (Peterson 1996). And it would make the system
more progressive in benefits at a time when it cannot possibly subsidize
almost all participants as in the past. The degree of progressivity, to be
sure, is a matter of political choice, but one thing surely speaks in favor
of adding to it: decades of growing inequality in the distribution of wages
and salaries, an inequality echoed in the personal savings for retirement
that people are able to amass during their working years. Incre a s e d
p ro g ressivity would also counteract the loss of pension benefits many
low-wage workers have incurred as their jobs have been “outsourced.” 
The goal of individual equity itself needs to be examined in light of
changing conditions. The 50 percent spousal benefit may have made
sense in Social Security’s early days, but it has led to the anomaly 
of relatively high pensions for many couples at already high income
levels. Survivor benefits, in contrast, are often too low to prevent many
elderly (especially the old-old) from slipping below the poverty line when
a spouse dies. The survivor gets the higher of (a) his or her own benefit or
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income for the survivor whose earnings and whose spouse’s earnings were
of the same order of magnitude. Now that women are fully re p resented in
the labor force and because they tend to outlive their husbands, they in
p a rticular face such a drop in income. As many as 30 percent of women
over the age of 80 who live alone fall below the federal poverty line, with
the percentage rising sharply as age increases (Moon 1997). “Until that
p roblem is addressed, Social Security is less than a success,” according to
f o rmer commissioner Robert M. Ball, one of the system’s otherw i s e
s t rongest apologists (personal communication 1997). 
Closing the Gap on the Tax Side 
Once almost invisible, Social Security taxes are now higher for most
middle-income Americans than are income taxes, at least if the
employer contribution is included in the count as income that workers
o t h e rwise would receive. The money’s worth issue for young workers,
who would be dispro p o rtionately affected by a further rise in payro l l
taxes, bears repeating, and so does the concern that the system transfers
income from low-income workers to high-income retirees. Any increase
in Social Security taxes, moreover, will crowd out the taxes needed to
right Medicare ’s long-term financial imbalance. Medicare can close
much of its financing gap on the spending side, although surely not all of
it without radical reduction in the scope of the program. 
Advocates of closing the 2.2 percent gap on the tax side point out that
the needed increases in revenue are small in the context of a gro w i n g
economy. Baker (1996 and personal communication 1997), for example,
calculates that a series of additions to payroll taxes of 0.1 percent per
year in the 36 years ending in 2046 (for a total of 3.6 percent) would
eliminate the long-term deficit. And all that such additions would do is
reduce the growth of real after-tax wages from, say, 1.0 percent to 0.9
percent per year; the level of real after-tax wages would still be half again
as high as it is now. Adding over 3 percentage points to the OASDI
payroll tax (and presumably at least several percentage points more for
HI) is almost certain, however, to threaten the financing of the rest of
g o v e rnment. The higher the tax rate, more o v e r, the harder issues of
intergenerational equity are to resolve. That the tax rate will have risen
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whom would have had a voice in setting the rate. 
Several changes in taxation nevertheless are justified. 
1. Because of the trend toward increased inequality in earned income,
covered wages have slipped as a percent of total wages, falling from 90
p e rcent in 1980 to 88 percent today (Kingson 1996), and they are
headed lower still as the distribution of income at the top apparently
continues to widen. A one-time adjustment in the wage base of, say, 2
p e rcentage points would only re t u rn the covered share of earn e d
income to historical norms. 
2. Including employer- p rovided health and life insurance benefits in
covered earnings would promote tax equity between those who pay for
health care and life insurance mostly out of before-tax income
(because those benefits are linked to their jobs) and those who lack
such benefits and thus pay for coverage largely out of after- t a x
i n c o m e .1 3 Including health care benefits, or only including those
above the norm, would yield economies in health care that are now
blocked by excessively favorable tax treatment of those benefits—a
plus for Medicare even if not for Social Security itself (Cadette 1997). 
Option 2: Privatization 
Privatization would split Social Security into two parts: a forced saving
and investment plan, with returns varying with market performance, and
a basic payment (tied only to number of years at work), which all benefi-
ciaries would receive. For each beneficiary 5 percentage points of the
c u rrent 12.4 percent Social Security tax rate would be devoted to an
individually managed personal security account, similar to a 401(k)
account and open to a wide range of investment vehicles, including
equities. The remaining 7.4 percent percentage points would fund the
basic payment and nonretirement benefits such as disability. 
An important point to stress is that it is not investment in the stock
market that distinguishes privatization plans. In that respect, the plans
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invest system re s e rves in the stock market. The distinguishing feature is
individual ownership and control of the assets. All the same, that would
not be worth all that much to Social Security participants were it not for
the relatively high potential re t u rns on equities. This explains why advo-
cates of privatization attach such importance to calculations showing how
even low- and middle-income workers would have a chance to accumu-
late wealth under their proposals. 
High re t u rns to equity and compound interest speak for themselves.
C o n s i d e r, for example, the eventual nest egg of the average earner if
during a lifetime of work he or she were to invest in the U.S. stock
market the 5 percentage points of the payroll tax that is to be set aside in
a personal security account. At historical real rates of real return of 7.5
p e rcent per year, the amount would grow to almost $700,000 in 1997
dollars over a period of 40 years.14 Even with a less adventuresome asset
allocation, say, 63 percent equities and 37 percent fixed-income securi-
ties, which would mimic the typical corporate 401(k) plan, the amount
would grow to almost $400,000—still an enviable nest egg.15 In either of
these cases, the re t i rement income from the dedicated 5 perc e n t a g e
points would be many times more than the small basic payment to be
made to Social Security beneficiaries at large. 
Only the unlucky and the timid, the theory is, would have to rely on
the basic payment for a significant share of re t i rement income. If they
had to do so, however, they would draw benefits considerably smaller
than they would receive under current arrangements. They are apt to be
people with the least experience as investors—typically low-income
workers with little or no prior savings, who also have the most to lose
since Social Security is apt to be the major, if not the only, source of
their re t i rement income. Significantly, the basic payment in the
personal security accounts plan (which would start at $410 per month
in 1996 dollars for those with a full-career work history) is only about
half the average benefit of new re t i rees tod a y, among them many with
much less than a lifetime of work. A meager guaranteed payment is
unavoidable if as much as 5 percentage points of the tax rate is to be
f reed up for individual investment and if at the same time the system is
to be brought into overall balance. 
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their privatized Social Security assets, and so at some point in their lives
they, too, would have to make do with benefits that would be consider-
ably lower than under present arrangements. Consistent with its
emphasis on choice in investments, the personal security accounts plan
does not re q u i re annuitization—a boon to heirs, to be sure, but yet
another source of risk to re t i rees who choose not to annuitize. Many
presumably would choose not to, and with good reason. Annuitization is
costly through private markets because of adverse selection; it is attrac-
tive to people who believe (often with inside information) that they will
live longer than actuarial tables project, and thereby it is costly to
everyone else. 
Other personal financial planning would be affected by doing away with
the essential feature of tod a y ’s Social Security: defined benefits annu-
itized at retirement age. Able to count on such benefits, households can
assume greater risk with their personal savings in order to build capital
for re t i rement income beyond the rock-safe base a Social Security
pension provides for most workers. If risk were introduced into the
Social Security part of a retirement portfolio, the risk-return calculations
on the rest of that portfolio perforce would also change. At least in part,
the re t u rns from privatization that even lucky investors would re a p
would be offset by lower returns from more risk-averse choices elsewhere
in the portfolio. 
A d v i s o ry and other investment service fees would also reduce the
re t u rns on privatized accounts. It would be politically awkward to
p revent those who earn little to put their 5 percent into individually
managed accounts—and, yet, it would be prohibitively expensive to
s e rvice those accounts (imagine the complexity of servicing the small
accounts of youngsters who work after school or during the summer).
Even for privatized accounts of normal size, administrative costs would
g reatly exceed those Social Security incurs tod a y. And they would
exceed the costs that would be incurred by government were it to invest
Social Security re s e rves in the stock market. That presumably would be
done through index funds whose servicing fees would be no higher
than, say, 25 basis points. Scale economies on amounts in the reaches of
h u n d reds of billions of dollars could easily drive the cost even lower. 
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accounts for spending as meritorious, if not more so, than re t i re m e n t .
At the very least, it would be heavy-handed for policymakers to
p rohibit a 55-year-old man from using his “own” account to pay, for
example, for a grandchild’s surg e ry, but to allow him to do whatever he
chooses with the money when he reaches re t i rement age. The disabled,
unless they had a strong taste for bequests, would be especially hurt by
the restriction that personal security accounts not be tapped until
re t i rement age. Those who become disabled would lose much of the
income they could count on tod a y, in exchange for the chance to build
wealth for their heirs. 
Political and Financial Risks of Privatization
Advocates of privatization acknowledge the volatility of investment in
private securities. But they emphasize that keeping Social Security
l a rgely as it is also entails risk in the form of political risk of pro g r a m
changes. Indeed, supposedly fixed benefits have turned out to be flexible
whenever, as now, the long-run financial soundness of the system cannot
be assured. 
Timing risks associated with investment are significantly greater than
the privatization advocates generally admit, however, judging by the
long stretches of weakness in the stock market in the past. The case
for allowing Social Security participants to invest in equities is
appealing after 15 years of a virtually uninterrupted bull market, but
it would not have gotten much of a hearing in 1978 after a decade of
historically low real re t u rns, which averaged minus 3 percent per
y e a r. And it would have seemed bizarre in the late 1940s and the
1950s when, despite the uptrend in the stock market, the memory of
the 1929 collapse of share prices and the Great Depression was still
f resh. Iro n i c a l l y, those would have been ideal times to embark on
privatization from the point of view of subsequent re t u rns; tod a y,
with stock prices at high levels, is perhaps the least appropriate of
times. The slumping Japanese stock market of the 1990s, after years
of speculative excess, provides yet another reminder of the risk of
equity investment. 
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Privatization also involves political risks. The basic payment, which
would have the stigma of “welfare” attached to it, would be vulnerable.
And pre s s u re to bail out the unlucky (with consequent damage to the
long-run financial health of the system) would be intense, especially if
t h e re were a major downturn in the stock market affecting the re t i re-
ment planning of large numbers of workers well up in age. There could
well come a time, even if many years from now, when it would be neces-
s a ry to reinvent tod a y ’s Social Security to “socialize” once again losses
that realistically could not be borne privately. 
The unlucky, to be sure, would be able to count on the basic payment
and, presumably also, on modest returns even from disappointing invest-
ment choices. But a privatization system, by design, would not be in a
position to supplement those amounts. The key role Social Security has
played over the years in reducing poverty among the elderly, especially
in the 1960s and 1970s when benefits rose sharply, would be under-
mined. Privatization would weaken the system’s goal of social adequacy,
just as that is about to become more important than ever before. 
It is not just the losers, more o v e r, who could wind up disappointed.
L o n g - run equity re t u rns of 7.5 percent per year in real terms (which
came from growth rates in economic activity and in profits significantly
above those that can be expected now and from an uptrend in price-
e a rnings ratios) cannot confidently be extrapolated into the future
(Baker 1997). For the 7.5 percent to hold, economic activity would have
to advance more rapidly than the expected trend of 2.0 percent to 2.5
percent per year; profits would have to mount to implausibly high levels
as a share of national income (and wages thus sink to implausibly low
levels); or marketwide price-earnings ratios, which are now at re c o rd
highs, would have to rise still further. 
Financing the Transition 
D i v e rting 5 percentage points from the payroll tax to privately owned
and managed accounts would make it impossible for Social Security to
meet accumulated obligations without raising taxes significantly. The
remaining 7.4 percent would have to fund pensions for retirees and the
next generation of retirees (workers who retire in, say, the next 10 years)
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workers whose contributions, while small thus far, could not be ignored.
New monies—in the form of taxes or borrowing—would have to be
raised for Social Security to meet all of these accrued obligations. 
Ultimately, the transition problem of making good on existing commit-
ments and financing privatized accounts at the same time will disappear.
But “ultimately” promises to be a long time in any realistic scenario.
Ahead would lie decades of Social Security taxes that are higher than
they are now or of budget deficits that are higher than they otherw i s e
would be. Young workers would be obliged to finance the pensions of
their elders to hold up their end of the intergenerational bargain that
otherwise would be in default. And they would also have to fund their
own Social Security benefits, since there would be no generation behind
them to make good on such a bargain. The personal security accounts
plan, for example, would add 1.52 percentage points (to be paid only by
the employee) to the 12.4 percent tax rate for the next 70 years. And,
until about 2030, it also would borrow from the Treasury (and, in turn,
from the public since Washington is unlikely to run budgetary surpluses).
At the peak, borrowings would reach $2 trillion (in constant 1996
dollars), which would increase outstanding debt held by the public by
roughly half. 
The borrowings would be repaid as transition costs retreat after 2030, but
for decades they would complicate, if not encumber, federal finance.
They would undermine the lending that Social Security, as now struc-
tured, is slated to provide to other functions of government in the next
decade or so of demographic calm. And they would add to the strain
Social Security will put on federal finance thereafter when the baby
boom generation actually retires and past lending to the rest of govern-
ment comes due. 
All the while, other government activities—in a nation seemingly
obsessed with deficits—would be under extraord i n a ry new pre s s u re to
cut spending. Identifying activities considered nonessential is hard
enough now. Even those who worry the loudest about deficit spending
cannot present, let alone agree on, an adequately long list. It will be
even more difficult to do so with the extra strain privatization would put
on federal finance. The danger is not so much the associated rise in the
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the emasculation of essential functions of government. 
Advocates contend that privatization would add to national saving, on the
supposition that households would save more than they do now in re s p o n s e
to the high re t u rns to personal security accounts. The Chilean case is often
invoked to make that point, although it is hardly relevant (see accompa-
nying box). Households may well save less, believing that those accounts
will supply more of their re t i rement income goal. How saving as a whole
would be affected is not at all certain—except positively through the tax
i n c rease of 1.52 percent needed to make privatization viable. 
G o v e rnment as Investor in Equities 
Investing in private securities through government would obviate many of
the problems inherent in privatization. Most important, that appro a c h
would minimize risk by sharing it. There would not be big losers, just as
t h e re would not be big winners. And, whatever the net re t u rns overall turn
out to be, they would be larger per dollar of investment because the invest-
ment advisory and other management fees would be appreciably lower.
Indeed, potential re t u rns on personal security accounts appear attractive
not because private management of funds can claim to offer better re t u rn s
than the market as a whole, but because the plan would have more
“money” to direct to investment in risky securities (Jones 1996a). 
Having government invest in the stock market is not pro b l e m - f re e ,
h o w e v e r. It would be hard to insulate such investment from political
control. Tobacco stocks in an index fund, for example, would be at odds
with federal eff o rts to curb smoking. Private nonprofit org a n i z a t i o n s
routinely instruct investment managers to use increasingly detailed
social screens to square their financial strategies with their missions. The
temptation for government to do so would be hard to resist, cert a i n l y
over the long haul. Government investment in private securities has
always been viewed as “socialism through the back door” and rejected on
those grounds rather than for any reason of risk. 
Moreover, the increased returns Social Security would capture would be
lost to other investors (Greenspan 1996). For the financial markets to
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Privatization in Chile: Not an Applicable Model 
Although the Chilean experience with social security privatization has been a success
in many ways, it was a response to problems very different from those this country
faces. And it was a success in ways that either are unlikely to be replicated in the
United States (e.g., bolstering the national saving rate other than by added taxes) or
are irrelevant (e.g., fostering the development of capital markets). 
C h i l e ’s social security system was in shambles by the mid 1970s. Payroll tax rates
exceeded 25 percent. Benefits were only tangentially linked to lifetime earn i n g s
(which fostered a large underground economy and thus made for punishingly high tax
rates for others). Administration was lax, governed all too often by political consider-
ations. Rampant inflation destroyed the real value of re s e rves. The plan had to be
repeatedly infused with general revenue (often plainly printing press money) in order
to stay afloat, especially during the early 1970s, when the far left governed under
President Allende.
Under the military government that deposed Allende, Chile opted for privatization,
with broad freedom in asset choice. The plan is financed only by employees, who got a
one-time pay hike of 18 percent in exchange for leaving employers out of the system.
C o v e red employees’ “contributions” (10 percent of earnings) are made to their
accounts at an administradora de fondos de pensiones, a new financial interm e d i a ry not
unlike the mutual fund in the United States. Government maintains a role only as
p rovider of minimum benefits and regulator of the a d m i n i s t r a d o r a s. Administrative
costs, while extraordinarily high at the start, have come down to the neighborh o od of
2 perc e n t .
Large surpluses in the general fund (almost 8 percent of GDP at the peak in 1980)
paved the way for smooth transition financing via “recognition bonds,” redeemable at
retirement and in the meantime lodged in privatized (but still mandatory) accounts.
The surpluses, in turn, reflected proceeds from the sale of public enterprises—part of a
b roader shift in economic policy away from state socialism and toward private
management and direction of the economy after the military took over. The pension
deficit (stemming from the recognition bonds) was used to absorb the budgetary
surpluses generated by the sale of public enterprises, preempting any move to reduce
taxes or to increase government spending in response to the surpluses. Even at the
height of transition financing, the consolidated central government deficit did not
exceed 3 percent of GDP (Santamaria 1991). In this sense, privatization lifted
national saving above what it otherwise would have been (The World Bank 1994).
Dictatorship made it comparatively easy to put all of this into effect.
Returns from the privatized accounts have been impressive. This, however, probably
reflects replacing state socialism with institutions of economic freedom (including
developed capital markets) more than it reflects the advantages of privatization itself.
Indeed, Chileans, thro u g h the a d m i n i s t r a d o r a s , a re still heavily invested (about 50
p e rcent) in government paper.
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have to be persuaded to buy instead the Treasuries Social Security would
forgo. At least in the first instance, returns on Treasuries would have to
rise and those on private securities to fall. Investors as a whole (among
them the Social Security trust funds) would be no better off. And they
should not be, since such a switch of assets is unlikely to affect the
productivity of capital and thus its returns. Returns under privatization
would be similarly vulnerable to such a change in relative returns.  
Fashioning a Consensus 
The maintenance of benefits approach, by its very nature, would right
Social Security’s long-run financial imbalance with minimal dislocation.
Privatization would also remedy the problem, but Social Security would
be changed, beyond recognition, in the process—a steep price to pay for
the relatively high returns many, but certainly not all, participants would
p robably reap as a result. The high re t u rns, more o v e r, are not all that
persuasive, given the opportunity to achieve the same returns by having
g o v e rnment do the investing. Where the investment risk should be
lodged, and thus the distribution of those returns, is the key issue. That
is as much an issue of values as it is of economics. 
If, after full national discussion, the choice is to keep Social Security
much as it is today, reaching agreement on specifically what benefits to
cut and what taxes to raise will not be easy. It will be less hard, however,
if the changes proposed evoke a sense of shared responsibility for
restoring the system’s long-run financial balance. Workers to re t i re in
the next 10 or 15 years could be expected to buy into a plan that would
assure their pensions long into the future, even if at the cost of modest
reduction in benefits. Low- and moderate-income workers, young as well
as old, would likely accept reductions in benefits if they see the reduc-
tions as a way of guaranteeing the kind of base level of income support
Social Security has traditionally provided. 
Adding to the saving incentives in the tax code—in effect, moving away
f rom taxation of income and toward taxation of consumption—would
make changes to Social Security taxes and benefits easier to accept. New
incentives for saving would graft a variant of privatization onto the
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than simply shifting the assets of Social Security participants fro m
g o v e rnment to private securities. Such an approach, more o v e r, would
have none of the downside of privatization: the risk, the dirigisme in the
use of what would become one’s own money, the redistribution of
income to the swift. Saving incentives would have essentially the same
effect as the Gramlich plan or any other dedication of a relatively small
increase in Social Security taxes to individual accounts, but they would
not have the compulsory character. 
High-income taxpayers would find it easier to accept making the system
m o re pro g ressive (for example, by using diff e rent percentage factors in
the calculation of benefits) if, at the same time, they were given the
opportunity to make larger contributions to 401(k), IRA, and other tax-
deferred savings plans. Such a combination would protect the pensions
of low- and moderate-income workers, while offering a reduction in
taxes that would move the tax system more toward neutrality between
saving and consumption, which would be a plus in its own right. Young
workers at all income levels would find it easier to accept further slip-
page in the implicit returns on their Social Security taxes if, at the same
time, they could more easily build a supplementary retirement nest egg.
They would be among those to profit most from tax-deferred income, on
the axiom that taxes deferred are taxes never paid. 
Casting the net wide in other ways is also in ord e r. The Canadian
“double-decker” model, in particular, ought to get a sympathetic hearing.
General taxation finances a flat payment made to all beneficiaries
(which is now means-tested); payroll taxes finance an added payment,
which is tied to lifetime earnings. While the particulars that would make
sense in the United States may differ, the principle that Social Security’s
i n c o m e - s u p p o rt function be financed broadly across the economy, and
not by a re g ressive tax on labor, applies. And so does the principle of
financing the individual equity function through earmarked payroll taxes
(although it is better to levy them only on employees in order to mini-
mize any distortion in the price of labor). 
Building a new measure of flexibility into Social Security benefits
f o rm u l a s — b y, for example, linking ongoing as well as initial benefits
to prevailing wages—also ought to be considered. Beneficiaries would
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(an outcome, by the way, they would have helped lay the groundwork for
during their working years). If, instead, the economy’s performance were
to be disappointing, re t i rees would share in the shortfall (this, too, on
the premise that “all are in the same boat”). Because it would be auto-
matic, adjusting pensions to the actual perf o rmance of the economy
would avoid the troublesome income distribution issues the nation must
now confront. It would redress Social Security’s inadequacy as a means of
reducing poverty among the old-old. It would involve less measurement
d i fficulty than linking benefits to inflation. And it would promote the
sense of shared responsibility that is needed for a consensus to emerge on
how to adapt Social Security to new circumstances. 
Such an action would, it is true, raise system costs because real wages rise
with productivity. But other changes to benefits formulas could be made
to offset such a rise. Benefits could be lowered early in retirement when
personal savings and other sources of retirement income can readily be
called on in most cases. Replacement rates are hardly immutable,
judging by the system’s history. 
Even if existing benefits remain linked to the price level, consideration
should be given to shifting the pattern of benefits forw a rd. If Social
Security can be made a fair annuity for someone retiring at any age
between 62 and 70, it can be made no less fair by skewing the distribu-
tion of the same lifetime benefit to the later years. In any case, the high
poverty rate of the old-old cautions against arbitrary reduction in cost-
of-living escalation based on broad-brush estimates of how much infla-
tion is overstated. 
The Essence of the Challenge 
It is important in the debate on Social Security’s future that the nation
not lose sight of the underlying problem the coming demographics
present: an uncommonly large transfer of real resources from the working
to the retired population. This is in the offing, by whatever means the
baby boom’s Social Security benefits are financed, however much the
baby boom saves independently for its re t i rement, and however much
the economy grows in the meantime. 
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ment, but investment—presumably most of it in the public sector
because of the time horizon—that will yield dividends long into the
f u t u re. Long-lived public capital can do a lot to ease the transfer of
resources across generations of markedly different size. 
I n c reased labor force participation by people reaching re t i rement age
would also help (Levy 1995). There is little to be gained, and much to be
lost, by having loss of Social Security benefits touched off by low ceilings
on earnings (currently $13,500 per year). However appropriate those
ceilings may have been in the past, they are much less so today. With the
baby boom generation’s re t i rement on the horizon, the nation can ill
a ff o rd incentives to shelve human capital pre m a t u re l y, even if its
productivity has slipped from peak levels. 
Finally, serious attention has to be given to reducing the nation’s current
account deficit. The transfer abroad of command over re s o u rces that
e v e r- g rowing external indebtedness points to cannot but make the
transfer of resources across generations of markedly different size all the
more difficult.
N o t e s
1. Section 706 of the Social Security Act requires the secretary of health and
human services to appoint an advisory council every four years to review
the long-run financial outlook of the trust funds under the Social Security
u m b rella and to make recommendations on how best to pre p a re the
p rograms for the future. The council was composed of 13 members,
including the chairman, representing the general public, workers, business,
and the self-employed.
2. The 2.2 percent is the difference between the 75-year cost rate and income
rate, based on the intermediate-cost assumptions for wages, interest rates,
life expectancy, and other key variables. The high-cost assumptions
generate an imbalance as large as 5.5 percent; the low-cost assumptions, a
surplus of 0.2 percent.
3. This is true in the abstract, although the cutbacks in benefits and other
p roposed measures, the six council members point out, would raise net
revenue enough to allow the Social Security trust funds both to invest in
equities and to buy as much of the Tre a s u ry ’s offerings as it would under
current law. 
4. A f t e r-tax replacement rates are higher for low- and average-wage workers
since for the most part their Social Security benefits are not taxed. 
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against budget targets. 
6. Disability benefits were not included in the analysis because of the paucity
of detailed data on recipients of past benefits and the uncertainty about
future benefits. 
7. P rojections based on the 1983 re f o rms, which were intended to achieve
l o n g - t e rm financial balance, have gone far off course for several re a s o n s .
Among the most important are the simple passage of time puts the system
into greater deficit (surplus years near term get replaced by deficit years
further out in time); the economic assumptions for such things as real wages
were lowered; disability payments turned out to be considerably higher than
expected. The time problem remains, but past estimating errors are no indi-
cation that today’s projections will also go far off course. 
8. Most of the group lined up behind increasing payroll taxes as well, but not
until near the middle of the next century, when the passage of time will
have rendered today’s proposals inadequate to maintain balance.
9. The revenue would be re-booked starting in 2010, by which time, the
assumption is, the refinancing of Medicare will be in effect. 
10. The income taxes paid on the payroll taxes of employees points up the even
broader linkage between Social Security and federal finance as a whole. The
revenue from payroll taxes has always been credited to the general fund, but
it could just as well have been credited to OASDI.
11. A l t e rn a t i v e l y, a rise in payroll taxes of 0.15 percentage points for both
employer and employee would provide the same effect on the long-ru n
deficit. Although viewed as preferable to a further raising of the retirement
age—which was rejected by all but one of the maintenance of benefits
group—the alternative tax proposal conflicts with the group’s general rejec-
tion of increasing payroll taxes to close the long-term funding gap.
12. Reflecting the trend toward forced early retirement, the labor force partici-
pation rate of men between the ages of 55 and 64 is now 67 perc e n t ,
compared with 85 percent in the mid 1960s. 
13. The recently enacted Kennedy-Kassebaum legislation levels the playing
field, but not fully until 2006.
1 4 . The calculation is based on Ibbotson Associates data for the period 1926 to 1996.
15. In violation of the principle of diversification of assets (among them human
as well as financial capital), roughly half of the equity holdings of the 1,000
l a rgest 401(k) plans are in own-company stock (Pensions & Investments
1997, 34). Nonequity holdings are dominated by GICs (guaranteed invest-
ment contracts), a close cousin to long-term CDs. Fixed-income assets are
projected to return 2.5 percent per year in real terms, in line with the trend
from 1926 to 1996 as calculated by Ibbotson Associates.
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